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HOW THE D.C. CIRCUIT MADE DOWNWIND ATTAINMENT UNATTAINABLE IN HOMER CITY
In October 1948, a dense fog of air pollution formed over the industrial town of Donora,
Pennsylvania.1

The cloud remained for five days, killed 20 people, and resulted in the

development of respiratory problems in 6,000 of the 14,000 town residents.2 A subsequent
investigation revealed extraordinary levels of several pollutants, including sulfur dioxide,
fluorides, and soluble sulphants in the air.3 The atmospheric contamination was caused by
various sources, including a nearby zinc smelting plant, a sulphuric acid plant, and coal burning
steam locomotives.4
In December 1952, a "Killer Fog" consumed London.5 The condition was caused by an
especially cold November and the resultant burning of records amounts of coal. 6 The smog was
so thick, and visibility so poor, that buses had to be escorted by guides carrying flashlights.7 As
a result, at least 3,000 people had perished.8
It was events such as the above that led to the enactment of the Clean Air Act (CAA) in
1970.9 While the above events are not at risk of recurring, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the agency tasked with implementing the CAA, continues to pursue
1

EPA.GOV., Understanding the Clean Air Act, http://www.epa.gov/air/peg/understand.html (last visited January
10, 2013).
2
Id.; see also Papers of James H. Duff, The Donora Smog Disaster (October 31, 1948) (on file with Pennsylvania
State Archives), available at http://www.donorasmog.com/archivesdonorasmogdisaster.htm.
3
Duff, supra note 2.
4
Id.
5
EPA.GOV., supra note 1.
6
John Metcalf, Dec. 9, 1952: 'Killer Fog' smothers up to 12,000 Londoners, STORM WATCH 7 WEATHER BLOG
(Dec. 9, 2011, 2:57 PM), http://www.wjla.com/blogs/weather/2011/12/dec-9-1952-killer-fog-smothers-4-000people-in-london-13893.html.
7
EPA.GOV., supra note 1; see also Metcalf, supra note 6.
8
Id.
9
42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006).
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its statutory mandate to improve air quality in the United States. The EPA's efforts often trigger
legal challenges by states and industry. In the past fifteen years this has been particularly true
with respect to the subject of this Comment—cross-state air pollution.10 Pollutants can travel
great distances and thereby affect health not only locally but regionally.11 "The transport of
these pollutants across state borders makes it difficult for downwind states to meet health-based
air quality standards" set by the EPA.12 The EPA's efforts to prevent such effects have been
litigated each step of the way, as the EPA has tried to achieve the requisite environmental gains
in a cost effective manner, as required by the spirit of the 1990 amendments to the CAA. As the
following explains in detail, the EPA lost the most recent battle, and possibly the war, in EME
Homer City Generation, L.P. v. E.P.A. ("Homer City")13 where the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit")14 eviscerated the EPA's cost-based approach, as
well as any likelihood that cross-state air pollution will be controlled in the foreseeable future.
INTRODUCTION
"[A]ir quality in a particular location - even close to a source like a power plant - is due to
a combination of local emissions and emissions from upwind sources hundreds of miles away.
This long-distance transport of pollution across state lines makes it difficult for downwind states
to" meet the minimum air quality standards set by United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA)15, even if a downwind state is adequately regulating sources within its borders.
To deal with the problem of upwind states adversely affecting air quality in downwind states, the
Clean Air Act (CAA) includes language, known as the Good Neighbor provision, which
10

Michigan v. EPA 213 F.3d 663 (D.C.Cir.2000); North Carolina v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008); EME
Homer City Generation, L.P. v. E.P.A., 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
11
EPA.GOV., Interstate Air Pollution Transport, http://www.epa.gov/airtransport/ (last visited March 2, 2013).
12
Id.
13
EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. E.P.A. 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
14
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
15
EPA.GOV., Where You Live, http://www.epa.gov/airtransport/whereyoulive.html (last visited January 6, 2013).
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prohibits an upwind state from emitting pollutants that will "contribute significantly" to a
downwind states failure to meet the minimum air quality standards.16

Under the authority of

this provision, the EPA promulgated the Transport Rule, also known as the Cross-State Air
Pollution Rule (CSAPR),17 in August 2011.18 The Transport Rule requires power plants in
twenty-seven states to reduce their emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulfur dioxide (SO2)
because their emissions "significantly affect the ability of downwind states to attain and
maintain" minimum air quality standards.19 Upon legal challenge, however, the Transport Rule
was struck down in Homer City by the D.C. Circuit as exceeding the statutory authority of the
EPA.20 This Comment examines the Homer City decision.
Many different states contribute to air quality in a given downwind location and the EPA
is faced with the complicated task of first determining which of the upwind states are
"significantly" impacting downwind air quality in a particular downwind state (such states are
hereinafter referred to as "significant contributors") and second deciding the degree to which
each so identified state must reduce its pollution emissions to rectify the problem.21 Deciding
which states are significant contributors is not and has never been controversial. Apportioning
the necessary emission reductions among the significant contributors, however, is the sticking
point.22

16

The cap-and-trade programs23 historically implemented by EPA have focused on

42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006).
EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. E.P.A., 696 F.3d 7, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
18
Transport Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011).
19
Id. at 48,208–09.
20
Homer City, 696 F.3d at 11.
21
See generally Transport Rule 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208.
22
See generally Homer City 696 F.3d 7; Michigan v. U.S. E.P.A., 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000); N. Carolina v.
E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
23
"Cap and trade is a market-based policy tool for protecting human health and the environment by controlling large
amounts of emissions from a group of sources. A cap and trade program first sets an aggressive cap, or maximum
limit, on emissions. Sources covered by the program then receive authorizations to emit in the form of emissions
allowances, with the total amount of allowances limited by the cap. Each source can design its own compliance
strategy to meet the overall reduction requirement, including the sale or purchase of allowances, installation of
pollution controls, and implementation of efficiency measures, among other options. Individual control requirements
17
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ensuring that emission reductions are achieved in a cost-effective manner.24 The Transport Rule
is one such program and through the Transport Rule the EPA made cost-effectiveness even more
of a focus. That is, the Transport Rule only requires an upwind state to reduce emissions so long
as it can be done cheaply.25 The effect of this cost-based approach is that those states that can
reduce emissions cheaply are required to dramatically reduce their emissions, while those states
for which achieving reductions would be expensive are allocated a lesser burden. 26 The degree
to which a state must reduce its emissions, therefore, is not directly tied to the extent that its
emissions affect air quality in downwind areas, but is rather tied to its costs of reducing its
emissions. Thus, the critical question regarding the Transport Rule is whether the EPA can
require certain states to bear a greater burden of the necessary emission reductions, solely
because they can do so more cheaply than another.27 In Homer City, the D.C. Circuit answered
this question in the negative.28 The court found that the Transport Rule, in effect, shifts the
burdens of overall compliance from those states that most detrimentally affect downwind areas,
are not specified under a cap and trade program, but each emission source must surrender allowances equal to its
actual emissions in order to comply. Sources must also completely and accurately measure and report all emissions
in a timely manner to guarantee that the overall cap is achieved.
A well-designed cap and trade program delivers:
- Greater environmental protection at lower cost
- Broad regional reductions, facilitating state efforts to address local impacts
- Early reductions, a result of allowance banking and market incentives
- Environmental integrity and transparent operations and results
- Fewer administrative costs to government and industry
- Efficiency and innovation incentives
- Incentives for doing better and consequences for doing worse
- Accounting for all emissions
- Partnership with existing requirements to ensure protection of the local population and environment"
EPA.GOV, Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/captrade/basic-info.html (last visited March 1, 2013).
24
Ed Dolan, Court Rejects EPA Cross-State Air Pollution Rule. Where to Next?,
http://www.economonitor.com/dolanecon/2012/08/27/court-rejects-epa-cross-state-air-pollution-rule-where-to-next/,
(last visited January 10, 2013).
25
See Transport Rule at 48,246–48.
26
Homer City, 696 F.3d at 11 ("[U]nder the Transport Rule, upwind States may be required to reduce emissions by
more than their own significant contributions to a downwind State[] . . .").
27
Id.
28
Id.
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to those upwind states that can achieve emission reductions most cheaply.29 This, the D.C.
Circuit found impermissible.30
The Transport Rule was also struck down on a second ground. Under the CAA, the states
are provided the first opportunity to regulate the emitters of pollution within its borders. 31 The
EPA determines the degree of reductions that must be achieved within a state to promote public
health and welfare, but it is the state that first decides how those reductions will be
accomplished.32 A state is provided the opportunity to do so through a State Implementation
Plan (SIP).33 It is only after a state fails to promulgate a sufficient SIP that the EPA can
intercede and directly regulate the sources of pollution through a Federal Implementation Plan
(FIP).34 Through the Transport Rule, however, the EPA promulgated FIPs, which directly
regulate sources within the subject states, without providing the states the first opportunity to
implement the required emission reductions via SIPs.35 To the court, this approach by the EPA
impermissibly encroached on the role first reserved to the states by the cooperative federalism36
structure of the CAA.37
Part I of this Comment provides background to the CAA generally, and the Good
Neighbor provision specifically. Part II discusses the seminal cases interpreting the Good
29

Id. at 27 ("[W]hen EPA asks one upwind State to eliminate more than its statutory fair share, that State is
necessarily being forced to clean up another upwind State's share of the mess in the downwind State").
30
Id. at 11.
31
Id. at 28.
32
Id.
33
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(a), 7410(a)(1) (2006).
34
42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (2006).
35
Transport Rule 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,208.
36
Cooperative federalism is where "state and local governments administer and implement federal programs. Many
state-administered programs are funded by the federal government, in whole or, more often, in part. Others take the
form of conditional preemption, meaning that the states may choose to administer the federal program or else, cede
the regulatory field to the federal government. Cooperative federalism covers an enormous array of regulatory fields,
from the environment to education to welfare . . . ." Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS.
L.J. 557, 558 (2000)
37
Homer City, 696 F.3d at 34 ("In sum, the text and context of the statute, and the precedents of the Supreme Court
and this Court, establish the States' first-implementer role under [and] [w]e decline to adopt a reading of . . . that
would blow a hole in that basic structural principle").
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Neighbor provision prior to the Homer City decision. Part III details the Transport Rule and the
judicial holdings of the Homer City case. Part IV critically analyzes the application of the case
law and statutory principles to the Transport Rule in Homer City. Part V discusses how to
resolve this judicial debacle. Part VI concludes.
This Comment argues that although the Homer City rejection of the EPA's cost-based
approach can be reconciled with the literal text of the CAA, because the EPA's approach may
also be reconciled with the CAA and is consistent with the D.C. Circuit's Good Neighbor
provision precedent, the EPA's interpretation should have been upheld as permissible.
Furthermore, because the Homer City decision effectively prevents the EPA's use of cost-based
factors, a reversion to a command-and-control38 approach to cross-state air pollution is
inevitable. This result can only be avoided through a change in course by the judiciary, which
can only be achieved via Supreme Court review39 or a statutory amendment to the CAA
expressly authorizing the EPA to use cost-considerations while implementing the Good
Neighbor provision. With respect to the EPA's practice of directly regulating state sources of
pollution through FIPs, this Comment argues that the plain language of the statute allows the
EPA this flexibility wherever the states have utterly failed to address their obligations.
I. BACKGROUND AND BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CAA—AIR POLLUTANTS, NAAQS,
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM, AND THE GOOD NEIGHBOR PROVISION
Under Title I of the CAA, the EPA is required to establish minimum air quality
standards, necessary to protect the public from the adverse effects of air pollution.40 In statutory
jargon, these air quality standards are known as national ambient air quality standards
38

"'Command and control' regulations focus on preventing environmental problems by specifying how a company
will manage a pollution-generating process. This approach generally relies on detailed regulations followed up by an
ongoing inspection program." Ralph Stuart, Command and Control Regulation,
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Command_and_control_regulation (last visited March 2, 2013).
39
The EPA's petition for rehearing en banc was denied on January 24, 2013. See
http://www.winston.com/index.cfm?contentID=19&itemID=168&itemType=25&postid=1248.
40
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2) (2006).

6

(“NAAQS”).41 The NAAQS are the "centerpiece" of the CAA.42 NAAQS must be established
for each air pollutant "which may . . . endanger public health or welfare . . ."43 and are to be
established at a level necessary to protect the public from "known or anticipated adverse effects
associated with the presence of . . . air pollutant[s] in the ambient air."44 "Ambient air is the air to
which the general public has access, as opposed to air within a facility or at a smokestack."45
The EPA has established NAAQS for six common air pollutants: nitrogen dioxide (NO2), carbon
monoxide (CO), lead (Pb), SO2, particulate matter (PM), and ozone (O3).46
The CAA also requires the EPA to divide the country into areas designated as
“nonattainment,” “attainment,” or “unclassifiable” with regards to each air pollutant, depending
on whether the area meets the NAAQS.47

A geographic area that meets the NAAQS is an

attainment area; areas that do not meet the NAAQS or contribute pollution to nearby areas that
do not meet the NAAQS, are called nonattainment areas.48

"An area may be designated

attainment for some pollutants and nonattainment for others."49 An unclassifiable area is an area
that cannot be classified on the basis of available information.50
While it is the EPA's responsibility to set the NAAQS for each of these pollutants,51 each
state, not the EPA, is charged with initial authority to regulate the emitters within its borders to

41

42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A), (B) (2006).
Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2347 (1996).
43
42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A), (B) (2006).
44
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2) (2006).
45
EPA.GOV, Air Quality Management - National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for Criteria Pollutants,
http://www.epa.gov/apti/course422/apc4a.html (last visited January 10, 2013).
46
Id.
47
42 U.S.C. § 7407(c), (d)
48
EPA.GOV, supra note 45.
49
EPA.GOV, supra note 45.
50
EPA.GOV, supra note 45.
51
The pollutants subject to the NAAQS derive from various sources. Carbon Monoxide (CO) is a colorless,
odorless gas formed when carbon in fuel is not burned completely. Motor vehicle exhaust, industrial processes,
residential wood burning, and forest fires all contribute CO to the atmosphere. Sulfur Oxides (SOx) are colorless
gases formed by burning sulfur and is formed when fuel containing sulfur (e.g. coal and oil) is burned, and when
gasoline is extracted from oil. Over 65% of SO2 released to the air comes from electric utilities. Nitrogen oxides
42
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ensure attainment of the NAAQS.52 Each state must develop a SIP demonstrating how it will
regulate sources within its borders to attain and maintain each NAAQS. 53 Specifically, "[e]ach
State shall . . . adopt . . . within 3 years . . . after the promulgation of a [NAAQS], a plan which
provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such . . . standard . . . within [the]
State."54

But if a state is untimely in submitting a compliant SIP, the obligation to regulate

emission sources within that state vests in the EPA, which must promulgate a FIP for the state to
follow.55 Specifically, the EPA "shall promulgate a [FIP] at any time within 2 years after [it]
finds that a State has failed to make a required submission or finds that the plan . . . does not
satisfy the minimum criteria . . ."56 The EPA must also promulgate a FIP if it "disapproves a
[SIP] . . . unless the State corrects the deficiency, and [EPA] approves the plan . . . before [it]
promulgates such [FIP]."57 In short, the states are provided the first opportunity to decide how
they will attain the NAAQS.58 If, within the prescribed timeframe—three years—a state fails to
effectively regulate the polluters within its borders, then the EPA must determine which emitters
(NOx) are a group of highly reactive gases that are involved in the formation of ozone. Nitrogen oxides form when
fuel is burned at high temperatures. The primary sources of NOx are motor vehicles, electric utilities, and other
industrial, commercial, and residential sources that burn fuels. Ozone (O3) is a gas composed of three oxygen
atoms and is not usually emitted directly into the air, but at ground level is created by a chemical reaction between
oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the presence of heat and sunlight. The
concentration of ozone in a given locality is influenced by many factors, including the concentration of NO2 and
VOCs in the area, the intensity of the sunlight, and the local weather conditions. Ozone and the chemicals that react
to form it can be carried hundreds of miles from their origins, causing air pollution over wide regions. Lead (Pb) is
a metal found naturally in the environment as well as in manufactured products. The major sources of lead
emissions have historically been motor vehicles (such as cars and trucks) and industrial sources. The highest levels
of lead in air are generally found near lead smelters.
Particulate Matter is the general term used for a
heterogeneous mixture of solid particles and liquid droplets found in the air, including dust, dirt, soot, smoke, and
liquid droplets. Particles can be suspended in the air for long periods of time. They come from a variety of sources
such as cars, trucks, buses, factories, construction sites, tilled fields, unpaved roads, stone crushing, burning of
wood, and the combustion in motor vehicles, at power plants, and in other industrial processes. PM2.5 describes
the "fine" particles that are less than or equal to 2.5 µm in diameter. PM10 refers to all particles less than or equal
to 10 µm in diameter (about one-seventh the diameter of a human hair).
52
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(a), 7410(a)(1) (2006).
53
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2006).
54
42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006).
55
42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (2006).
56
Id.
57
42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006).
58
Id.
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in the state will be regulated, and to what extent.59 This practice, by which the states implement
federal programs, is known as cooperative federalism.60
The SIP/FIP dynamic discussed above also applies where emissions of a state travel
downwind and result in a downwind state's inability to the meet the NAAQS for one or more
criteria pollutants.61 Under the Good Neighbor provision of the CAA, added as an amendment in
1990,62 each SIP (or FIP) must "contain adequate provisions—prohibiting . . . any source . . .
within the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will contribute significantly to
nonattainment in . . . any other State with respect to any such [NAAQS] . . . ."63 It is this
language—determining how to regulate those emissions that "contribute significantly to
nonattainment" in a downwind state—that has proven problematic for the D.C. Circuit and EPA.
II. PAST EPA EFFORTS TO APPLY THE GOOD NEIGHBOR PROVISION
Some sources of air pollution are well positioned to reduce emission levels, while others
are not. For those that can only reduce air emissions through implementation of costly measures,
compliance with mandated emission reduction requirements can be financially crippling.
Because the effect of these regulations can disproportionately affect different emission sources,
the regulatory scheme historically employed by the EPA64 has recognized the utility of achieving
emission reductions in the most cost-effective manner.65 The Transport Rule pushed the use of
this cost-based approach to its furthest end yet.

The EPA's predominant consideration in

deciding who is required to effect necessary emission reductions, through the Transport Rule and
under the auspices of the Good Neighbor provision, was whether a state could achieve emissions
59

Id.
Greve, supra note 36.
61
42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006).
62
Michigan v. U.S. E.P.A., 213 F.3d 663, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
63
42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006).
64
EPA's approach is known as cap-and-trade. See supra, note 23.
65
Id.
60

9

cheaply,66 rather than the effect of those emissions on downwind NAAQS.67 Such an approach
effectively shifted the burdens from those states that were most detrimentally affecting
downwind areas, to those states that could achieve emission reductions cheaply. In determining
that such an approach is impermissible, the precedent of the D.C. Circuit was controlling.
Homer City was the culmination of a decade's worth of doctrinal narrowing.

The

contours of the EPA's authority have taken shape through the decisions of the D.C. Circuit.68
This process commenced in Michigan v. EPA,69 continued in North Carolina v. EPA,70 and came
to a head in Homer City. What started as a seeming endorsement of cost-based apportioning of
emission reduction obligations, has now taken a one hundred and eighty degree turn,
jeopardizing a decade's worth of regulation and the resultant environmental gains.

The

remainder of this section traces the seminal cases, Michigan and North Carolina, whose
doctrinal interpretations were put to work in Homer City.
A. Michigan v. EPA
In Michigan v. EPA, twenty-two states challenged the EPA's 1998 NOx Rule,71 which
quantified their Good Neighbor obligations under the 1997 ozone NAAQS.72 These states
argued that the EPA exceeded its statutory authority by impermissibly using cost-considerations
in determining to what extent each state must reduce its emissions.73

66

EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. E.P.A., 696 F.3d 7, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
See Transport Rule 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 46–48.
68
Michigan v. EPA 213 F.3d 663 (D.C.Cir.2000); North Carolina v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008); EME
Homer City Generation, L.P. v. E.P.A., 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
69
213 F.3d 663 (D.C.Cir.2000).
70
North Carolina v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896, 903-04 on reh'g in part, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
71
See 63 Fed.Reg. 57,356–58.
72
Michigan v. U.S. E.P.A., 213 F.3d 663, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
73
Id. at 669.
67
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The 1998 NOx Rule utilized a two-step process to determine each state's Good Neighbor
obligation. First, the EPA determined those states that were "significant contributors,"74 and, as
such, were required to reduce their ozone emissions.75

The significant contributors were

identified as those states that contributed more than two parts per billion (ppb) of ozone to a
downwind non-attainment area.76 The D.C. Circuit in Michigan described this amount as a "very
low threshold."77 Determining which states were significant contributors was not controversial.
After determining which states would be subject to a Good Neighbor obligation, the
EPA's next step was to determine the extent of that obligation.78 Rather than requiring each state
to reduce its emissions down to the two ppb threshold that was utilized to define those states as
significant contributors, the EPA required those states to reduce their emissions by the amount
that could be achieved through "highly cost-effective controls."79 Therefore, although two ppb
was the threshold for determining whether a state was a significant contributor, this threshold
was not determinative in defining each state's Good Neighbor obligation.80 If a state could not
cost-effectively reduce its emissions to the two ppb threshold, EPA would not compel the state to
do so.81
The D.C. Circuit upheld the rule, including the EPA's cost-based approach, finding that
the EPA may "consider differences in cutback costs, so that, after reduction of all that could be
cost-effectively eliminated, any remaining 'contribution' would not be considered 'significant.'"82
Therefore, "the ultimate line of 'significance,' whether measured in volume of NOx emitted or

74

Id. at 679.
Id. at 675-80.
76
Id. at 675.
77
Id.
78
Michigan v. U.S. E.P.A., 213 F.3d 663, 675-80 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
79
Id. at 675; 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,403.
80
Michigan, 213 F.3d at 675.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 677-79.
75
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arriving in nonattainment areas, would vary from state to state depending on variations in
cutback costs."83 Although not explicitly noted by the Michigan court, it is later made clear in
Homer City, that critical to the 1998 NOx Rule being upheld was that even though the cost-based
approach served to lessen the potential obligations of those upwind states that could not reduce
emissions cheaply, no evidence was presented to suggest that these lessened burdens resulted in
a corresponding increased burden to those upwind states that could reduce their emissions more
cheaply.
B. North Carolina v. EPA
In North Carolina v. EPA the D.C. Circuit reviewed the EPA's 2005 Clean Air Interstate
Rule (CAIR).84 CAIR established the Good Neighbor obligations of twenty-eight states with
respect to the 1997 ozone and fine particulate matter NAAQS.85 The first step for the EPA in
establishing the Good Neighbor obligations, just as it was with the 1998 NOx Rule upheld in
Michigan, was to determine which states were significant contributors.86 The thresholds for
being deemed a significant contributor were set at .2 micrograms per cubic meter for fine
particulate matter and two ppb for ozone.87 After utilizing these thresholds to determine which
states would have a Good Neighbor obligation, the EPA proceeded to define that obligation—
which mirrored the process employed by the 1998 NOx Rule.88 The Good Neighbor obligations,
however, were established on a region-wide, rather than state by state basis,89 and included a
trading program.90

83

Id. at 675.
See 70 Fed.Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005).
85
North Carolina v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
86
Id.
87
North Carolina, 531 F.3d at 903-04.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 904.
90
"[Trading] programs display the following key features:
84
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With respect to fine particulate matter, the EPA set the total emission budget for the
region to mirror the fine particulate matter allowances that state power plants received under
Title IV of the CAA.91 The pre-existing Title IV allowances had been established by Congress
to address an acid rain problem.92 Although the Title IV program involved regulating the same
pollutant that was the subject of the NAAQS—fine particulate matter—the Title IV allowances
were not established based on downwind non-attainment of NAAQS.93 Furthermore, the EPA
never established a relationship between the pre-existing Title IV allowances and attainment of
the downwind NAAQS for fine particulate manner.94 Essentially, the EPA already had a system
in place for regulating the emission of fine particulate matter, i.e. the Title IV allowances, and
rather than independently evaluating whether this system was sufficient to ensure attainment of
downwind NAAQS, it simply assumed so.95 Because the EPA did not establish a connection
between pre-existing power plant allowances under Title IV and attainment of downwind
NAAQS, the court struck down the EPA's approach as arbitrary and capricious.96 Of relevance
here is that the EPA apparently believed the approach to be a cost-effective way to achieve the
NAAQS.97

An emissions 'cap': A limit on the total amount of pollution that can be emitted (released) from all regulated sources
(e.g., power plants); the cap is set lower than historical emissions in order to reduce emissions.
Allowances: An authorization to emit a fixed amount of a pollutant.
Measurement: Accurate tracking of all emissions.
Flexibility: Sources can choose how to reduce emissions, including whether to buy additional allowances from other
sources that reduce emissions.
Allowance trading: Sources can buy or sell allowances on the open market. Because the total number of allowances
is limited by the cap, emission reductions are assured.
Compliance: At the end of each compliance period, each source must own at least as many allowances as its
emissions." EPA.GOV., Allowance Trading Basics, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/trading/basics.html (last visited
March 3, 2013).
91
Id. at 917.
92
Id. at 902.
93
Id. at 917.
94
Id. at 918.
95
Id.
96
North Carolina v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896, 917 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
97
CAIR, 70 Fed.Reg. at 25,199 (quoting Proposed CAIR, 69 Fed.Reg. 4566, 4612 (Jan. 30, 2004)).
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With respect to establishing Good Neighbor obligations for the ozone NAAQS, the EPA
also established a regional cap for upwind states.98 The manner in which the regional cap was
established was not challenged.99 The manner in which the emission allowances were then
distributed, however, was challenged.100 In determining the emission allowances that would be
distributed to each state, the EPA used a methodology unrelated to each state's contribution to
downwind non-attainment; it was based on the goal of "achieving a reasonable balance of
regional and local controls to provide a cost-effective and equitable governmental approach to
attainment."101

To achieve this goal of cost-effectiveness, the EPA allocated the emission

allowances based on how cheaply a state could reduce its emissions.102 States that could reduce
their emissions more cheaply received less allowances; those that could only do so expensively
received more.103 Thus, rather than explaining how its distribution of credits related to each
states' significant contributions to downwind non-attainment, the EPA simply asserted that the
distribution would create an equitable balance of controls.104 So again, as with the SO2 caps, the
EPA did not link its distribution of credits to each states contribution to downwind nonattainment.105 The EPA determined a cap for the region and then "evaluated it to assure that it is
highly cost-effective."106 Moreover, the EPA chose this approach because it "reflect[ed] the
inherently higher emissions rate of coal-fired plants, and consequently the greater burden on coal
plants to control emissions," thereby creating "a more equitable budget distribution."107 In short,
because it would be more difficult for states with coal-fired power plants to meet lower emission
98
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thresholds, the EPA gave such states more emission credits, irrespective of how the various
states contributed to downwind non-attainment.
The North Carolina court acknowledged that the EPA's determination of each state's
Good Neighbor obligation may include cost considerations.108

However, because CAIR

involved a regional trading program, the EPA's application of the Good Neighbor provision in
CAIR did not directly link each state's Good Neighbor obligation to its own cost of reducing
emissions.109 Rather, the EPA made one state's Good Neighbor obligation dependent on another
state's cost of eliminating emissions.110 States burning clean fuels were punished because other
state's burned dirty fuels, not because of their own significant contribution to downwind nonattainment of NAAQS.111 With these findings, the court found that the Good Neighbor provision
did not give the EPA the authority to force an upwind state to share the burden of reducing other
upwind states' Good Neighbor obligations.112

Instead, each state must eliminate its own

significant contribution to downwind pollution.113 Because CAIR shifted the burden of emission
reductions solely in pursuit of equity among upwind states, the resulting state budgets were
arbitrary and capricious.114
III. THE TRANSPORT RULE AND HOMER CITY
A. The Transport Rule
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On August 8, 2011, the EPA issued the Transport Rule,115 its replacement for CAIR—the
rule struck down in North Carolina.116 The Transport Rule required SO2 and NOx emission
reductions from power plants in twenty-seven states.117

The required emission reductions,

expressed as state emission budgets, were intended to address each state's contribution to nonattainment of NAAQS in downwind states.118 Just as it did with the 1997 NOx Rule and with
CAIR, the EPA again used a two-step process to quantify each state's Good Neighbor
obligation.119 The first step defined which states were significant contributors, based upon
whether the state emits “amounts which will . . . contribute significantly” to a downwind state's
nonattainment of the NAAQS.120 This initial threshold was established at (i) 0.8 ppb for ozone,
(ii) 0.15 μg/m3 for annual PM2.5, and (iii) 0.35 μg/m3 for 24–hour PM2.5.121 If modeling showed
that a state would send more than those amounts into a downwind state's air, the upwind state
was deemed a significant contributor.122 States contributing amounts greater than the above
thresholds were subject to Good Neighbor obligations; states contributing less were not required
to reduce their emissions under the Good Neighbor provision.123
After determining which states would be subject to Good Neighbor obligations, the
Transport Rule next determined the extent of that obligation for each state, which was
established using a cost-based standard.124 Each state with a Good Neighbor obligation was
required to reduce its emissions to the extent that its power plants could achieve the reductions at
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a specified cost per ton.125 Thus, the emissions reductions imposed on the states, once they were
determined to be significant contributors, was not actually linked to the amount of emissions that
had been determined to contribute to non-attainment of NAAQS downwind.126 Rather, the Good
Neighbor obligation was based on how much could be reduced cost effectively.127 These figures
were then used to generate emission budgets for each pollutant in each state subject to a Good
Neighbor obligation.128 "The budget is the maximum amount of each pollutant that a State's
power plants may collectively emit in a given year, beginning in 2012."129
To ensure that each state would stay within these budgets, the EPA simultaneously
promulgated FIPs.130 The FIPs required power plants in upwind states to make the SO2 and NOx
reductions needed to comply with each upwind state's emissions budget.131 The FIPs also
created an interstate trading program to allow regulated sources to comply as cost-effectively as
possible.132 The FIPs converted each state's emissions budget into “allowances,” which were
allocated among power plants in the state.133 Under the FIPs, it was the EPA, and not the states,
that decided how to distribute the allowances among the power plants in each state.134
The Transport Rule retained a limited, secondary role for SIPs.135 States were given the
option of submitting SIPs that modify some elements of the FIPs.136 States could also replace
the FIPs wholesale as long as the SIP prohibited the amounts of NOx and SO2 emissions
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specified by the EPA.137 Each SIP was to be reviewed by the EPA "on a case-by-case basis."138
However, the states were not provided a post-Transport Rule opportunity to avoid FIPs by
submitting a SIP or SIP revision, but rather the FIPs "remain[ed] fully in place in each [] state
until a state's SIP [was] submitted and approved by EPA to revise or replace a FIP."139
B. Homer City
As the EPA continued its efforts to finalize and implement the Transport Rule, various
electric utilities, industry trade associations, and states filed petitions challenging the rule.140
After consolidating the petitions, the D.C. Circuit issued an order staying implementation of the
Transport Rule pending resolution of the petitions.141 Under the order, the CAIR remained in
effect pending resolution of the Transport Rule challenge.142 Congress also entertained various
legislative initiatives to repeal or postpone the Transport Rule. In September 2011, for example,
the House of Representatives passed the Transparency in Regulatory Analysis of Impacts on the
Nation Act143 which would have delayed the Transport Rule pending further study; no action was
taken on the bill in the Senate. In November 2011, Senator Rand Paul introduced a resolution to
repeal the Transport Rule that was defeated by a vote of 56 to 41.144 In Homer City, the D.C.
Circuit reviewed the Transport Rule on the merits.
i. Homer City Majority
a. The EPA's use of Cost-Considerations
The majority in Homer City struck down the Transport Rule on two grounds. Firstly, the
majority found that the Transport Rule fell outside of the EPA's statutory authority under the
137

See Id. at 48,328.
Id.
139
Id.
140
EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, No. 11-1302 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 30, 2011).
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
H.R. 2401
144
Clean Air Act Handbook § 3:10 (2012)
138

18

CAA because the Good Neighbor obligations assigned to upwind states were not based on the
emissions from those states that actually "contribute[d] significantly to nonattainment” in
downwind states.145 When the EPA first established a threshold to determine those states that
were significant contributors, the majority came to see that threshold as a "floor" below which
any contribution must be viewed as insignificant, and as such, the Good Neighbor provision
could not be used to mandate reductions below that threshold.146 Despite this, the Transport
Rule did, in some cases, require states to reduce their contributions to levels below that floor.147
This resulted because the Transport Rule required states to eliminate all emissions that could be
achieved at a specified cost per ton.148 The Transport Rule did not cap these reductions at any
particular numerical emission threshold, but instead states were required to continue to reduce
emissions until further reductions were no longer cost effective. To the majority, when the EPA
ignored this initial threshold in determining each state's Good Neighbor obligation, it served to
"redefine each State's 'significant contribution' in such a way that an upwind State's required
reductions could be more than its own significant contribution to a downwind State."149 In other
words, "if amounts below a numerical threshold do not contribute significantly to a downwind
State's nonattainment, EPA may not require an upwind State to do more."150 Because the EPA
did just that, the court found that the Transport Rule exceeded the EPA's statutory authority
under the CAA.151
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Relatedly, the majority found that the Transport Rule violated the "proportionality
requirement" as described in North Carolina.152 Specifically, the court found that the EPA has
"no authority to force an upwind state to share the burden of reducing other upwind states'
emissions."153 In the majority's view, when a state is required to reduce its emissions to a level
below that which contributes significantly to non-attainment downwind, the additional burdens
serve to compensate for reduced Good Neighbor obligations conferred to other states.154 That is,
just as the EPA's cost-based approach required states that could cheaply reduce emissions to
"exceed the mark," the cost-based approach simultaneously served to limit the Good Neighbor
obligations of those states that could only reduce emissions through costly measures.155 The
majority did acknowledge that, under Michigan, the EPA may rely on cost factors to reduce the
Good Neighbor obligations of those states where it would be very expensive for them to hit the
numerical threshold.156 For the majority, the EPA's reliance on cost factors could not also extend
to require a state to eliminate more "than its statutory fair share," because "that State is
necessarily being forced to compensate for another upwind State's downwind contribution."157
The court found this result—the EPA's failure to allocate the required reductions on a
proportional basis— to be impermissible under both the statute and North Carolina.158
Thirdly, and again relatedly, the majority found that the EPA failed to ensure that the
cumulative Good Neighbor obligations of the various upwind states did not produce unnecessary
over-control in the downwind States.159 The court found the EPA's statutory authority to be
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limited to merely attaining the NAAQS in the downwind states,160 and as such, the EPA could
not require the upwind states to do more than necessary to accomplish that goal.161 Because the
Transport Rule did not take steps to avoid such over-control, the majority deemed it
impermissible under the CAA.162
b. The EPA's Use of FIP's
The majority also vacated the Transport Rule on a second, entirely independent ground.
While establishing each upwind state's Good Neighbor obligation, the EPA simultaneously
issued FIPs to implement emission reduction measures directly on sources in those states, to
enforce those Good Neighbor obligations.163 The EPA did so without giving the states the initial
opportunity to promulgate SIP's to implement the obligation themselves.164 The majority
concluded that such a practice is not authorized by the CAA.165
In supporting its position that the EPA did not have the authority to implement the
emission reduction measures through FIPs prior to giving the states the opportunity to submit
SIPs, the majority first pointed to uncontested principles regarding the structure of the CAA.166
Under the CAA, the EPA has authority to set NAAQS, but the role of first-implementer is
reserved for the states.167 It is only after a state fails to submit a sufficient SIP that the EPA may
promulgate FIPS.168 Here, the EPA conceded that the state has three years to implement its
SIP.169 Despite this the EPA argued that the three year period available to the state began to run
at the establishment of the NAAQS (i.e. 1997), not when the EPA gets around to quantifying the
160
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state's numerical obligation under the Good Neighbor provision.170 Under such a construction,
the states were required to develop SIPs that incorporate their Good Neighbor obligation by
2000.171 Because the states did not effectively develop SIPs satisfying their Good Neighbor
obligations, the EPA contended that it was authorized to promulgate FIPs at any time
thereafter.172 The majority, however, found that the three year period for implementing a SIP
began to run when the EPA quantified the Good Neighbor obligations of the various states and
notified them of the same.173 In the view of the majority, the "EPA's approach punishes the
States for failing to meet a standard that EPA had not yet announced and the States did not yet
know."174
The relevant statutory language can be found in Section 110 of the CAA, which governs
SIPs.175 Section 110(a)(1) requires states to submit SIPs to implement each new or revised
NAAQS.176 Section 110(a)(2) lists many elements that a SIP must contain to enable the state to
attain the NAAQS, and measures to satisfy the states Good Neighbor obligation is one such
required element.177 Furthermore, the statute requires that when the EPA finds that a state "has
failed to make a required submission" or "disapproves a [SIP] submission in whole or in part,"
the EPA must "promulgate a [FIP]" within two years, "unless the State corrects the deficiency"
in the interim, in a manner approved by the EPA.178
The majority defined the issue as whether a state's implementation of its Good Neighbor
obligation can be considered part of the state's "required submission" in its SIP, or whether the
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SIP can be deficient for failing to incorporate the Good Neighbor obligation, even before the
EPA quantifies the state's Good Neighbor obligation.179 In the majority's view, a state cannot be
required to address its Good Neighbor obligation as part of the initial SIP submission.180 Rather,
it is the EPA's quantifying of a state's Good Neighbor obligation is what "require[d]" the state to
make a "submission" implementing the Good Neighbor obligation on sources within the state.181
It is only after the EPA had set the relevant emissions budgets for each state that it may require
states to submit new or revised SIPs.182

After the EPA defined a state's Good Neighbor

obligation, the state must have been provided reasonable time to implement that requirement on
sources within the state.183 It was uncontroverted that the triggers for a FIP are the EPA's finding
that a SIP fails to contain a "required submission" or the EPA's disapproving a SIP because of a
"deficiency."184 The majority, however, found that a SIP cannot be deemed to lack a required
submission or be deemed deficient for failing to implement the Good Neighbor obligation until
after the EPA had defined the state's Good Neighbor obligation.185 "The regulated entities—
here, the upwind States—need more precise guidance to know how to conform their conduct to
the law. A SIP logically cannot be deemed to lack a 'required submission' or deemed to be
deficient for failure to meet the [G]ood [N]eighbor obligation before EPA quantifies the [G]ood
[N]eighbor obligation."186
In concluding that a state cannot be required to address its Good Neighbor obligation
until the EPA determines what that obligation is, the majority relied on the canon of statutory
construction that the words of a statute must be read in context and with a view of their place in
179
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the overall statutory scheme.187 In the majority's view, determining the level of reductions
required under the Good Neighbor provision is analogous to setting a NAAQS, and it is such a
determination that triggers the period during which states may submit SIPs or SIP revisions.188
That approach fits comfortably within the statutory text and
structure. In both situations—setting a NAAQS and defining
States' good neighbor obligations—EPA sets the numerical end
goal. And in both cases, once the standards are set, 'determining
the particular mix of controls among individual sources to attain
those standards' remains 'a State responsibility.'189
The majority also relied on the fact that the EPA has applied the Good Neighbor
provision in the past, exactly as the majority here construes the statute.190 Based on these
principles, the majority vacated the Transport Rule and the Transport Rules FIPs and remanded
the proceeding to the EPA.191 It also directed the EPA to continue administering CAIR pending
the promulgation of a valid replacement.192
ii. Homer City Dissent
a. The EPA's Use of Cost-Considerations
With respect to the majority's position regarding the use of cost-based standards to
establish each state's Good Neighbor obligation, the dissent only challenged this position on
jurisdictional, not substantive, grounds.193 This Comment only addresses substantive issues, and
therefore the dissent offers nothing significant in this regard.
b. The EPA's Use of FIP's
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With respect to the EPA's FIP first approach, the dissent evaluated its validity by
focusing on the strict statutory language.194 The language of the CAA unquestionably requires
the EPA to issue a FIP within two years after a state fails to make a "required submission" or
submits a deficient SIP.195 As noted above, the majority held that a state could not be required to
incorporate its Good Neighbor obligation into a SIP until after the EPA quantified that
obligation.196 To the dissent, this holding misleadingly suggested that the text of the CAA
actually requires the EPA to establish Good Neighbor obligations in the first instance, in which
case the promulgation of a SIP addressing the states Good Neighbor obligation could not
logically be required until the thresholds are set by the EPA.197 The dissent viewed this as a
falsity and therefore reproduced the relevant statutory language, emphasizing the critical
language:
(a)(1) Each State shall . . . adopt and submit to the Administrator,
within 3 years (or such shorter period as the Administrator may
prescribe) after the promulgation of a [NAAQS] (or any revision
thereof) . . . a plan which provides for implementation,
maintenance, and enforcement of such [ ] standard . . . within such
State.
(2) Each implementation plan submitted by a State under this
chapter . . . shall
...
(D) contain adequate provisions—
(i) prohibiting, consistent with the provisions of this subchapter,
any source or other type of emissions activity within the State from
emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will—
(I) contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with
maintenance by, any other State with respect to any such
[NAAQS].198
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To the dissent, the plain text required that within three years of the EPA's promulgation
of a NAAQS, states were required to submit their SIPs, and those SIPs were required to include
adequate Good Neighbor provisions.199 The dissent believed that this plain reading represented
the unambiguous chronology established by Congress—the EPA has the initial burden to set the
NAAQS, and then the states have a series of follow-up duties to ensure attainment of the
NAAQS; one such duty clearly assigned to the states being the inclusion of adequate Good
Neighbor provisions in SIPs.200 Notably absent from the statute, in the dissent's view, is any
requirement that the EPA quantify each state's Good Neighbor obligation.201 The dissent found
the failure of the unambiguous text to impose such a requirement on the EPA to dramatically
undermine the majority position that it was such action by the EPA that triggered "the period
during which States may submit SIPs."202 Furthermore, the dissent found that, even if the statute
were ambiguous, the court would be required to defer to the EPA's interpretation that states have
an independent obligation to include Good Neighbor provisions in their SIPs within three years
of the promulgation of the NAAQS because such an interpretation is permissible under the
statute.203
The dissents conclusion is predicated upon the canons of statutory construction that the
court must begin with the language of the statute204 and "[w]hen the words of a statute are
unambiguous, then . . . judicial inquiry is complete."205 Applying these principles to the actions
of the EPA as an administrative agency, the first step in statutory interpretation requires a
determination of "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
199
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intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."206 If, however, "the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," the court must defer to an agency's
statutory interpretation if it "is based on a permissible construction of the statute."207
The dissent went on to contend that even though the EPA, in previous instances,
implemented the SIP/FIP process with respect to Good Neighbor obligations as the majority now
required, the EPA was not restricted to its previous policy choices.208 For the dissent, so long as
the EPA acknowledged that it was taking a different approach, presented "good reasons" for
doing so, and its new approach was "permissible under the statute," then it could in fact take a
different approach.209 "Agencies 'need not demonstrate to a court's satisfaction that the reasons
for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one.'"210 The dissent stressed that the
EPA acknowledged its previous approach and explained its decision in "response to comments"
requesting states be given time to submit SIPs before EPA imposed the FIPs. 211 The EPA
explained its decision on the grounds that it had "no authority to alter the statutory deadlines for
SIP submissions and that the CAA did not require it to issue a rule quantifying States' '[G]ood
[N]eighbor' obligations."212 Moreover, "the court in North Carolina, in remanding rather than
vacating CAIR, 'emphasized EPA's obligation to remedy [CAIR's] flaws expeditiously' and thus
'EPA d[id] not believe it would be appropriate to establish a lengthy transition period to the rule
which is to replace CAIR.'"213 Because the EPA explained why it was departing from its
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previous approach, the dissent believed that the FIP first approach was within the EPA's
authority.214
IV. INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF THE DIVERGING OPINIONS
As detailed above in Section III, the Transport Rule was struck down on two grounds.
First, the majority found that EPA's cost-based approach to apportioning Good Neighbor
obligations inconsistent with the statute and the D.C. Circuit precedent on the issue.215 Secondly,
the majority found the FIP first approach to be counter to the statutory text.216 In contrast, the
dissent believed the EPA acted within its authority.217 This section analyzes the legal bases on
which the court relied to reach these conclusions.
A. Validity of the EPA's Cost-Based Approach
To determine whether the EPA’s cost-based approach to assigning Good Neighbor
obligations was appropriate, courts must correctly interpret and apply the principles laid out in
Michigan and North Carolina. Engaging in such an analysis demonstrates that although the
Homer City holding can be reconciled with the pure statutory text, the holding is inconsistent
with precedent, and therefore EPA's interpretation of the Good Neighbor provision should have
been deemed permissible under the Chevron analysis. The Homer City holding significantly
restricts the EPA's ability to use cost-based factors in apportioning Good Neighbor obligations.
This regression by the D.C. Circuit places the EPA in an untenable position if the EPA is to
continue to achieve air quality gains in an efficient manner.
As detailed in Section II above, the two main cases interpreting the Good Neighbor
provision are Michigan and North Carolina. These cases interpreted the "significantly contribute
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to non-attainment" language that is the focal point of the Good Neighbor provision. Equal
weight, however, should not be conferred unto to the analyses of each case. Michigan is much
more on point because the Transport Rule is essentially an extension of the rule reviewed in
Michigan.

Additionally, North Carolina struck down CAIR primarily on arbitrary and

capricious grounds, not on the merits of the rule as applied to the CAA. Therefore, the D.C.
Circuit's substantive application of North Carolina to support its Good Neighbor analysis is
misplaced.
In several respects, the rule that was reviewed in Michigan is structurally similar to the
Transport Rule. Both rules established a base-line threshold for determining which states were
significant contributors.218 In both instances, the process by which the EPA established this
base-line threshold was not challenged.

After determining which states were significant

contributors, both rules then utilized a cost-based analysis to quantify the Good Neighbor
obligations of those states.219

In these respects, the two rules appear to operate almost

identically. There is, however, one critical operative distinction that led the court to uphold the
rule in Michigan, but to strike down the Transport Rule—proportionality.
In Michigan, operation of the rule in question led to a reduction in the Good Neighbor
obligations of some significant contributors.220 The use of cost considerations, however, only
served to reduce potential Good Neighbor obligations and there was no evidence that any states
saw a corresponding gain in obligations.221 Although the framework of the Transport Rule was
similar, it resulted in some significant contributors being tasked with greater Good Neighbor
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obligations then would have applied absent use of the cost-based factors.222

It was this

distinction that led the majority to conclude that the Transport Rule was invalid because the
result was to effectively shift the burden of reducing emissions from states that could not do so
cost effectively, to those that could—a factor not related to actual contribution to downwind nonattainment.223
This line of analysis by the majority in Homer City places great weight on use of the term
"significant." When the majority uses the term "significant," it uses it as a direct parallel to the
manner in which significant is used in the statute—the significance of emissions being defined
solely in terms of its absolute impact on non-attainment downwind.224 But a different approach
was taken by the court in Michigan. In Michigan, the court viewed significance more pliably,
finding that the EPA may "consider differences in cutback costs, so that, after reduction of all
that could be cost-effectively eliminated, any remaining 'contribution' would not be considered
'significant.'"225 Thus, in Michigan, the D.C. Circuit took the position that the EPA's initial
threshold for determining which states were significant contributors could be detached from the
ultimate determination of the required reductions.226 The EPA tried to utilize this very same
approach with the Transport Rule by first defining which states were significant contributors and
then using independent criteria—cost-based factors—to determine the extent of the required
reductions.227 Although, as a framework, this is entirely consistent with Michigan, the Michigan
court was not faced with some states being tasked with increased burdens through the use of the
independent cost-based criteria. Therefore, in context, the Homer City court's refusal to adopt
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"significant" as expansively as the court in Michigan is understandable, and in applying
Michigan, it can be seen how the Transport Rule was struck down.

The Transport Rule

undoubtedly extended the use of cost-based factors beyond the use in Michigan and the Homer
City court decided that the extent of the EPA's latitude was defined in Michigan. The Homer
City court, however, did not rely on Michigan alone.228 And it is the D.C. Circuit's application of
the principles from North Carolina that leaves its interpretation of the EPA's authority under the
Good Neighbor provision inconsistent and severely constraining.
Homer City makes clear that not only is the EPA unable to use cost-based factors to
increase a state's Good Neighbor obligation, but the EPA must also ensure that its program does
not result in over-control in the downwind states.229 Applying this second principle, the severe
constrictions on the EPA become apparent. Certainly, the EPA must minimally ensure that the
Good Neighbor obligations it establishes are sufficient to ensure attainment of the NAAQS. But
at the same time, its measures must not result in over-control.230

Abstractly, these two

requirements create a level of emissions reductions that the EPA must achieve; not too much or
over control results, and not too little because the downwind states won't meet their NAAQS.
Superficially, this appears reasonable. The EPA's ability to consider cost factors to reduce Good
Neighbor obligations, however—a practice which remains authorized following Homer City—
has not yet been considered in conjunction with these mandates. Cost factors have become
engrained in the EPA's approach to compliance with the CAA.231

The court in Michigan

endorsed this approach by upholding the EPA's practice of reducing the Good Neighbor
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obligations of various states based on cost factors.232 Homer City, however, implicitly precludes
this same practice.
If the EPA reduces a states' Good Neighbor obligations pursuant to Michigan, but cannot
achieve a corresponding gain from another state, for how will the reduced Good Neighbor
obligations be accounted? Based on the majority analysis in Homer City, the reduced Good
Neighbor obligations cannot be accounted for elsewhere. So even assuming that the EPA could
initially strike the appropriate balance of "not too much, not too little," this balance would be
destroyed when the EPA reduces Good Neighbor obligations based on cost factors, as allowed
by Michigan. The EPA's use of cost-based factors to only reduce the Good Neighbor obligations
of some states, without a corresponding gain elsewhere, would result in under-control and a
failure to attain downwind NAAQS. In short, under Homer City, the EPA's options are to only
reduce Good Neighbor obligations based on cost-based factors as allowed by Michigan, with the
understanding that downwind NAAQS will not be attained, or to ignore cost considerations
altogether in apportioning Good Neighbor obligations, thereby abandoning over a decade of
regulatory development.
In Michigan, the court allowed the EPA to consider cost factors.233 The EPA ran with
this leeway and made cost factors the linchpin behind its approach to implementing the Good
Neighbor provision.234 Moving forward, the restriction of this discretion by the D.C. Circuit in
Homer City will make it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for the EPA to achieve its
mission in a practical way. Somewhat ironically, the D.C. Circuit's approach in Homer City is
entirely consistent with the plain language of the CAA. It is only when the import of Homer City
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is read in conjunction with Michigan, that the absurdity of the D.C. Circuit's Good Neighbor
provision jurisprudence becomes apparent.
B. Validity of the EPA's FIP first approach
The issue presented with respect to the SIP/FIP dynamic of the Good Neighbor provision
is a classic Chevron deference issue. Under Chevron, where the statute speaks directly to the
question at issue, the court will afford no deference to the EPA's interpretation, but rather "must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."235 But where the statute does
"not directly address[ ] the precise question at issue, . . . the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute," and the court will only
reverse that determination if it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."236
An action is "arbitrary and capricious" if the agency implementing the regulation in question has
relied on factors which Congress had not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in
view or the product of agency expertise.237
With these background principles in mind, the dissent convincingly undermines the
majority's interpretation of the statutory text with respect to the SIP/FIP dynamic. The text of the
statute plainly provides significant contributors three years from the establishment of the
NAAQS to implement SIPs.238 Furthermore, the statute clearly requires that the SIPs include
several components, including measures to satisfy the states Good Neighbor obligations.239 If
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the state fails to do so, the obligation shifts to the EPA to promulgate adequate FIPS.240 There is
nothing in the plain and unambiguous sequence laid out in the statute suggesting that the states
may delay the promulgation of a sufficient SIP, while it awaits the establishment of a numerical
Good Neighbor obligation by the EPA. In fact, as the dissent points out, the CAA does not
require the EPA to quantify Good Neighbor obligations at all. Although the CAA does not
require the EPA to establish numerical Good Neighbor obligations, the majority requires that the
EPA do so before the states can be expected to promulgate SIPs incorporating Good Neighbor
obligations. Thus, it is not a reading of the plain text, nor can it be, that leads the majority to this
conclusion. The majority, however, fails to recognize that it must first identify ambiguity or
absurdity before moving beyond the plain language of the statute.
The majority, rather, relies on the structure of the CAA. Based on this perspective,
"determining the level of reductions required under [the Good Neighbor provision] is analogous
to setting a NAAQS."241 Here the majority ignores a critical point; the statute specifically calls
for the EPA to set NAAQS, but it does not call for the EPA to determine the level of reductions
required under the Good Neighbor provision. So, while the majority can, in a conclusory
manner, analogize between the setting of a NAAQS and the establishment of numerical Good
Neighbor obligations, Congress expressly established the process for setting the NAAQS and did
not do so for the establishment of the Good Neighbor obligations.
Because of the above flaws in the majority reasoning, the Transport Rule should have
been upheld, as within the statutory authority of the EPA, and as consistent with the D.C. Circuit
precedent interpreting the contours of the Good Neighbor provision.
V. REGULATORY VS. STATUTORY FIX
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The EPA cannot reconcile the principles laid out by the Homer City majority with the
continued use of cost considerations to establish Good Neighbor obligations. Therefore, any
future rule promulgated by the EPA must quantify actual downwind contributions that
significantly contribute to non-attainment and simply require each state to eliminate that quantity
of emissions. The EPA could easily amend the Transport Rule in this manner to arrive at a rule
compliant with the Homer City majority's view of the CAA. When the EPA establishes a
numerical threshold identifying those states that are significant contributors, this threshold must
be such that were every significant contributor to reduce its emissions to that level, all downwind
states would attain the NAAQS, but not result in over-control on the upwind states. It appears as
though this is precisely what the EPA did with step one of the Transport Rule. However, what
departs from the process employed by the Transport Rule is that the EPA must then require all
significant contributors to reduce their emissions to that threshold, irrespective of the costs
involved. The result would strike the appropriate balance required by the Homer City majority.
With respect to the FIP first approach that was struck down, the solution is even simpler. The
EPA must provide the state's the first opportunity to implement the necessary reductions through
their SIPs. Therefore, the EPA could relatively easily amend the Transport Rule to be compliant
with the Homer City majority's construction of the CAA.
The above solution, however, only demonstrates that the EPA could promulgate a rule
within the confines imposed by the Homer City majority. Practicality, however, dictates that
cost considerations must be included in the analysis. Implementing an economical approach to
pollution control was identified as one of goals of the CAA Amendments of 1990.242 It was
those amendments that established the emission trading programs that now supplement the
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traditional command-and-control approach to pollution control.243

The objective of this

economic shift in environmental policy was to ensure that expensive regulatory measures
achieve commensurate benefits "in terms of reducing threats to health and the environment."244
Only a finite number of resources can be committed to pollution control; that is not a brush aside
of the need for environmental progress, but is a reality. Environmental gains are more difficult
to come by now than they were in 1970 when the CAA was first passed. The "low hanging fruit"
has been picked. The past occurrences in Donora, Pennsylvania and London, England are not at
risk of recurring. Progress is no longer easy, so for the EPA to achieve the most significant
gains, it must ensure that resources are used effectively. And simply promulgating a rule that
reverts to the tired "command-and-control" approach is not enough. For that reason a statutory
amendment appears necessary.
The statutory amendment could be relatively simple and still provide the EPA the
flexibility that it requires to continue making environmental headway. The amendment could
consist of deeming all contributions to a downwind non-attainment area as "significant." Such a
provision would make clear that if a state is contributing to a downwind non-attainment area, the
EPA has the authority to require that state to eliminate all of its downwind contributions. The
amendment would not, however, alter the limits set by the NAAQS. So although the EPA would
have the technical authority to require a state to eliminate all downwind contributions, this
authority would be tempered by the judicial mandate to avoid over control. That is, the EPA
could only require a state to reduce downwind contributions as necessary to attain the NAAQS.
Deeming all downwind contributions as "significant" would provide the EPA the discretion to
reduce a state's Good Neighbor obligations based on cost-considerations without risk of violating
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the judicially announced "proportionality" standard. That is because deeming all contributions
as "significant" would effectively eliminate the proportionality requirement.

Because all

contributions would be "significant," any use of cost-based factors by the EPA would serve to
reduce, and only reduce, that state's obligation—there would be no corresponding increased
obligation elsewhere.
Such a statutory amendment would recognize air pollution as a problem of all states that
can only be managed through cooperation. It would limit the costs of environmental gains,
ensure that such gains are actually accomplished, and stop the continual delays that result from
incessant litigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The D.C. Circuit has created an untenable situation for the EPA. As the statute and
doctrine stands, the EPA is unable to formulate a rule that will satisfy its statutory mandate in an
efficient, practical manner. There are two ways to alleviate this problem. The Supreme Court
can grant a writ of certiorari and announce a CAA interpretation that does not so severely
constrain the EPA's flexibility. In the alternative, an amendment to the CAA is necessary.
Absent one of these circumstances, the EPA will be left to address its statutory mandate without
the tools to do so consistent with the intent of the 1990 CAA Amendments.
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